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Recent work in human cognitive neuroscience has linked self-consciousness to the processing of multisen-
sory bodily signals (bodily self-consciousness [BSC]) in fronto-parietal cortex and more posterior temporo-
parietal regions.We highlight the behavioral, neurophysiological, neuroimaging, and computational laws that
subtend BSC in humans and non-human primates. We propose that BSC includes body-centered perception
(hand, face, and trunk), based on the integration of proprioceptive, vestibular, and visual bodily inputs, and
involves spatio-temporal mechanisms integrating multisensory bodily stimuli within peripersonal space
(PPS). We develop four major constraints of BSC (proprioception, body-related visual information, PPS,
and embodiment) and argue that the fronto-parietal and temporo-parietal processing of trunk-centered
multisensory signals in PPS is of particular relevance for theoretical models and simulations of BSC and
eventually of self-consciousness.Introduction
Brain activity causes subjective experience, and over the last
two decades, research has investigated some of the major
neuronal mechanisms of conscious processing (Koch, 2004;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Early data regarding the neural
correlates of consciousness arguably came from clinical obser-
vations in neurological patients (i.e., (Poppel et al., 1973;
Weiskrantz et al., 1974; Bisiach et al., 1979), empowered by
psychophysics and, more recently, brain imaging (i.e., Kim and
Blake, 2005; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004). Although these
studies have led to a better understanding of visual conscious-
ness, the interaction of conscious and unconscious vision with
other senses has remained largely unexplored, although it is a
crucial element given the multisensory nature of consciousness
(Deroy et al., 2014; Faivre et al., 2014, 2015).
Importantly, the observer, or subject of conscious experience,
is also generally not accounted for in these models of perceptual
consciousness, although a fundamental property of conscious-
ness is its link with a self as subject of conscious experience.
Conscious perception, indeed, is not only a multisensory experi-
ence of an object (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976; Bertelson,
1999) but also includes a subject of experience: that is, the
implicit and pre-reflexive experience of being the subject of a
given experience. Thus, an object of perception is experienced
by someone, by the self, or by the subject of experience. The
latter is localized within a body, which is felt as one’s own, occu-
pying a given location in space. Recent research has revealed
that this important aspect of conscious experience—the implicit
andpre-reflexive experience of being the subject of a given expe-
rience—is based on multisensory brain mechanisms underlying
the integration of bodily signals; it has been the target of much
recent research and conceptual work in cognitive neuroscienceand philosophy of mind, and we refer to it as bodily self-con-
sciousness (BSC) (Christoff et al., 2011; deVignemont, 2011;Gal-
lese and Sinigaglia, 2010; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Jean-
nerod, 2003; Knoblich, 2002; Legrand, 2007; Damasio et al.,
2009). The associated experimental approach to BSC in healthy
subjects has alsobeen influencedby empirical work in behavioral
neurology and altered states of consciousness. We note that by
focusing onBSCwedeliberatively do not refer to or review cogni-
tive or conceptual higher-level notions of the self, as targeted by
other important lines of research in cognitive neuroscience (Gal-
lagher, 2000; Goldberg et al., 2006; Heatherton et al., 2006; Le-
grand and Ruby, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2005).
Studies of multisensory bodily processing allow the investiga-
tion of the subject of experience and have successfully induced
illusory states of BSC, such as the illusory feeling of an artificial
body part as one’s own (illusory body ownership or self-attribu-
tion). By manipulating visuo-tactile inputs, an illusory feeling of
ownership can be induced for an artificial hand (rubber hand illu-
sion; Botvinick andCohen, 1998) or for another person’s face (en-
facement illusion; Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010). Viewing
another person’s hand (face) being stroked in synchrony with
strokes applied to one’s own corresponding non-visible hand
(face) can induce illusory self-attribution of the seen hand (face).
Moreover, participants perceive their hand to be at a position
that is displaced toward the fake hand’s position (proprioceptive
drift) or judge another person’s face as similar to their own.
One of the main new arguments of the present paper is that
rubber hand and enfacement illusion rely on processing sensory
information from the space immediately surrounding the body (or
peripersonal space [PPS]), which is a particularly important
spatial compartment for BSC. Multisensory perception studies
(Spence and Driver, 2004) showed that tactile processing isNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 145
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Macaluso and Maravita, 2010; Occelli et al., 2011) and that
such modulation occurs in particular when these are presented
close to (within PPS), as compared to far from, the body.
Neuroimaging studies (Macaluso and Driver, 2005; Makin
et al., 2007; Serino et al., 2011a; Sereno and Huang, 2014) asso-
ciated these effects with brain regions in human posterior parie-
tal and premotor cortices, hosting bimodal and multimodal
neurons, as revealed by earlier neurophysiological work in
non-human primates (Duhamel et al., 1998; Graziano et al.,
1994; Rizzolatti et al., 1981). Similar regions also process signals
involved in self-attribution of the hand (Ehrsson et al., 2004;
Tsakiris et al., 2007; Evans and Blanke, 2013) and face (Cardini
et al., 2011; Apps et al., 2015).
More recent research has investigated trunk-related multisen-
sory processing, as it allows researchers to investigate brain
mechanisms that target the body as a global and unitary entity.
The importance of this latter approach was motivated by con-
ceptual work in philosophy of mind (Metzinger, 2004; Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009) and clinical data in neurological patients
suffering from disorders of BSC (Brugger et al., 1997; Blanke
et al., 2008). A series of studies in healthy volunteers revealed
that trunk-related bodily processing is of particular relevance
for key aspects of BSC, involving brain mechanisms beyond
ownership for a given body part (hand, leg, face). These experi-
mental studies also exploited visuo-tactile and visuo-vestibular
stimulations at the trunk for the induction of more global changes
in BSC, such as ‘‘full-body,’’ ‘‘out-of-body,’’ or ‘‘body-swap’’ illu-
sions (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and
Ehrsson, 2008; Aspell et al., 2013). Typically in these paradigms,
tactile stimulation is repeatedly applied to the back or chest
(Lenggenhager et al., 2009) of a participant who is being filmed
and so simultaneously views (on a head-mounted display
[HMD]) the stroking of a human body in a real-time video or vir-
tual-reality animation, in front of her/him, at a farther location.
When exposed to the full-body illusion, participants self-identify
with the seen virtual body (change in self-identification) and
show a forward drift in self-location (the experience of where
‘‘I’’ am in space) toward the position of the virtual body. In partic-
ular, behavioral and questionnaire data show that participants
perceive themselves to be located ‘‘in front’’ of the position
where they had been standing physically during the experiment.
Here, we argue that bimodal and multimodal neurons that inte-
grate visual, tactile, and vestibular information as defined in
monkey posterior parietal and premotor cortex are of key rele-
vance for these aspects of BSC. Neuroimaging data in humans
found such integration in fronto-parietal and temporo-parietal re-
gions, reflecting experimentally induced changes in self-identifi-
cation and self-location (Ionta et al., 2011; 2014; Petkova et al.,
2011; Gentile et al., 2015; Guterstam et al., 2015).
In this review, we develop four major neuroscientific con-
straints of BSC and apply them to (1) body ownership or self-
attribution of a body part (hand, face), (2) self-identification
with the full body, and (3) self-location (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009; Blanke, 2012). For this, we will describe the behavioral
laws of multisensory processing of bodily stimuli in PPS, the
major neuronal properties of bimodal and multisensory neurons
at the level of single neurons, the major brain regions and net-146 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.works involved in the processing and integration of such
signals, and the major computational approaches to BSC.
We note that other mechanisms contribute to self-conscious-
ness and BSC, such as the sense of agency for bodily actions
that is based on the additional integration with motor signals.
Interoceptive body-related inputs are also an important additional
mechanism inBSC. Both have been the topic of a large number of
studies and reviews (agency, e.g.: Jeannerod, 2003; Gallese and
Sinigaglia, 2010; Haggard and Chambon, 2012; Marcel, 2003; in-
teroception: Craig, 2002; Damasio, 2003; Seth, 2013). Current
research has also started to study global aspects of BSC (self-
identification and self-location) based on interoceptive signals
(Aspell et al., 2013; Ronchi et al., 2015) and sensorimotor signals
(Kannape et al., 2010; Kannape and Blanke, 2013). However, in
the present paper we focus on multisensory brain mechanisms
of exteroceptive bodily signals as, we believe, this is the simplest
account for BSC (see also Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).
Major Behavioral Laws of Multisensory Processing,
Multisensory Bodily Processing, and BSC
Multisensory Integration
Information from different senses is integrated in order to
improve perception (Fetsch et al., 2013; Ernst and Bu¨lthoff,
2004), and there are at least three general laws of multisensory
integration. Inputs from different modalities are more strongly
integrated the closer they occur in space (spatial law) and in
time (temporal law), and the weaker each unisensory input signal
is (inverse effectiveness) (Stein and Stanford, 2008; Stein et al.,
1989; Frassinetti et al., 2002). For example, in audio-visual
perception, participants are faster and more accurate in local-
izing the source of a visual target when a concurrent auditory
cue is presented at the same location, at the same time, and
when the intensity of the visual and the auditory stimuli is weak
(Spence and Driver, 2004; Calvert et al., 2004).
Concerning multisensory stimulation involving bodily signals,
several studies have shown that a visual (Spence et al., 2000)
or an auditory (Zampini et al., 2007) cue affects the perception
(i.e., it improves accuracy and speeds up reaction times) of a
tactile stimulus delivered to the hand; an effect termed crossmo-
dal congruency effect (CCE). CCE magnitude increases with
decreasing temporal delays between the multisensory stimuli,
in line with the temporal law of multisensory integration. In addi-
tion, the spatial arrangement of tactile targets and visual cues
determines CCE magnitude, with stronger CCEs when both
multisensory inputs are presented at the same spatial location
and weaker if the visual cue is presented further away from the
hand that has received the tactile stimulus (Spence et al.,
2004), in line with the spatial law of multisensory integration.
Multisensory Integration of Bodily Signals Is
Constrained by Proprioception and Body-Related Visual
Information
Although previously reviewed studies suggest that the inte-
gration of multisensory signals including bodily signals (i.e.,
tactile and proprioceptive signals) share similar laws of multi-
sensory integration (Van der Stoep et al., 2015), we argue that
multisensory integration of bodily signals relies on additional
constraints that are absent or minimal for exteroceptive events.
Consider the case of visuo-tactile integration. If we want to
Figure 1. Four BSC Constraints Determining Hand Ownership
(A—E) Stimuli applied to an artificial hand (blue hand) are integrated with stimuli on the physical hand, if the artificial hand is placed coherently with the posture of
the physical hand, whereas no change in hand BSC (i.e., illusory hand ownership) occurs if it is placed in an non-matching body posture ([A], proprioceptive
constraint). No change in hand BSC occurs for an object with a non-bodily shape ([B], body-related visual information constraint) or if the artificial hand is
presented outside the PPS of the real hand ([C], PPS constraint). A change in hand BSC is obtained if the real hand and the artificial hand receive synchronous and
prolonged visuo-tactile stimulation ([D], embodiment constraint). Note that, normally, these four constraints apply to the parts of one’s own physical body, leading
to the normal sense of body ownership (E). Red and green body of the participant indicates, respectively, absence or presence of BSC for the hand.
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position of the skin receptors detecting touch needs to be re-
mapped continuously from its fixed position on the skin to its
position in external space, where the visual cue is located
(Soto-Faraco and Deco, 2009; Heed et al., 2015). Thus, besides
visual and tactile cues, other inputs, such as proprioceptive sig-
nals, impact multisensory integration, defining the position of
the body in space and whether stimuli are related to the body
or not. In the case of auditory-visual integration, the auditory
and the visual cues both occur in external space, and their loca-
tion is determined by visual information in retinal coordinates,
auditory information in head coordinates, further integrated
based on eye position signals (Stricanne et al., 1996; Colby,
1998; Cohen and Andersen, 2000). Accordingly, for multisen-
sory perception of exteroceptive cues, no input from other mo-
dalities (if the eyes and head are fixed, see below) is needed,
and integration is determined based on the described laws of
space, time, and inverse efficiency. In the next section, we will
review behavioral studies in humans showing that the inte-
gration of multisensory bodily signals requires the concurrent
processing of several signals related not only to the stimuli
themselves but also to proprioceptive signals encoding the
subject’s body position. It is worth noting that this also makesstudying the integration of multisensory bodily signals more
difficult than for exteroceptive cues, because bodily-related in-
puts (e.g., signals about body-parts position) are always present
and more difficult to manipulate.
Several studies have shown that the spatial determinants
of the crossmodal interaction between tactile stimuli and visual
targets depend on the participant’s arm posture. For instance,
Spence et al. (2004) compared CCE strength when tactile targets
were delivered to the right or left hand, and visual cues were
administered to the right or left visual space. Usually, same
side visuo-tactile stimulation (e.g., visual cues on the left side
with tactile stimuli on the left hand) induces stronger CCE. How-
ever, if participants cross their hands, the effects reverses (right
visual cues interact more strongly with tactile stimulation on the
left hand), showing that multisensory integration of bodily signals
is re-referenced based on proprioceptive cues (spatial remap-
ping of touch; Soto-Faraco and Deco, 2009; Heed et al., 2015);
the prominent impact of proprioceptive signals for the percep-
tion of bodily signals is the first constraint for multisensory inte-
gration for BSC (see Figure 1A).
Other studies showed that multisensory integration of bodily
inputs is determined not only by the physical position of the
hand in space, as determined by proprioception, but also byNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 147
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its parts in space (body-related visual information) (Serino and
Haggard, 2010). For instance, Pavani et al. (2000) showed that
visual cues induced a stronger CCE over tactile targets (admin-
istered to the participants’ hidden hands), when the cues were
presented on fake hands, as compared to when they were pre-
sented exactly at the same spatial location, but without fake
hands, or when presented at the same position on fake hands
that were placed in a posture incompatible with the actual
posture of participants’ hands. Similar effects have been found
using mirrors (Maravita et al., 2002) or hand shadows (Pavani
and Castiello, 2004) to administer visual cues that, although be-
ing presented in a spatial location physically far from the place of
tactile stimulation, were processed as occurring on the body,
modulating tactile processing. Thus, top-down input related
to the perceived visual configuration of the body in space is a
second major constraint governing multisensory integration of
bodily signals for BSC (see Figure 1B).
Thus, integration of multisensory stimuli requires that sensory
inputs, originally processed in sensory-dependent reference
frames (e.g., visual stimuli in eye-centered, auditory stimuli in
head-centered, tactile stimuli in skin-centered reference frames),
are realigned and integrated into a common reference frame. In
the case of integration of exteroceptive inputs, such as audio-
visual integration (e.g., the noise and the flashing of a fire alarm
on the wall), multisensory integration is based on the spatial
relationship between the source of the visual and the auditory
cue, determined by the position of the visual stimulus on the
retina, the location of the sound in the auditory space, and sig-
nals related to eye and head position. Thus, additional sensory
signals (eye-head proprioception) only minimally concur with
the integration process of exteroceptive stimuli under static
conditions. Instead, in the case of bodily inputs (e.g., visuo-
tactile or audio-tactile stimuli), the common reference frame of
multisensory perception is the subject’s body, and the transfor-
mation—or remapping process—involves processing and
integration of additional proprioceptive and vestibular inputs
signaling the location of a tactile cue on the body in space (first
BSC constraint) and visual inputs related to the configuration
of the body in space (second BSC constraint).
Multisensory Integration of Bodily Signals Occurs within
a Limited Space around the Body: The PPS Constraint
Research in patients with crossmodal extinction following focal
brain damage have confirmed the importance of both constraints
inmultisensory bodily perception (di Pellegrino et al., 1997; Farne`
and La`davas, 2002; La`davas et al., 1998a; Farne` et al., 2000).
These studies also showed that a visual or auditory stimulus
more strongly interacts with tactile stimulation on the body
when the visual or auditory event occurs close to the perceived
location on the body, rather than farther away, within PPS. Serino
and colleagues provided behavioral support that for healthy par-
ticipants PPS is an additional critical factor for multisensory
bodily perception. They reported that responses to a tactile stim-
ulus delivered to the hand are enhanced if a concurrent, task-
irrelevant sound is presented close to the stimulated hand (inside
PPS) but not at larger distances (outside PPS) (Serino et al., 2007,
2011a). The border of PPS (i.e., themost distant position in space
from the body where this audio-tactile interaction effect occurs)148 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.was then defined by administering tactile targets coupled with
dynamic sounds, originating from a far location and approaching
the participant’s stimulated hand (Canzoneri et al., 2012). By pre-
senting tactile target stimuli at different delays from sound onset
(simulating different sound distances from the body), reaction
times to tactile targets became faster (compared to unimodal
tactile stimulation) once the sound entered the participants’
PPS. This facilitation effect was not linearly proportional to the
spatial position of the sound, but occurred for sounds within a
limited distance from the body (i.e., 40–50 cm for the hand),
beyondwhich no space-dependent modulation of reaction times
was found (Bassolino et al., 2015; Canzoneri et al., 2013a, 2013b;
Serino et al., 2015; Teneggi et al., 2013). These data show that
multisensory integration of bodily signals not only is governed
by the metric distance of external stimuli from the body, but
also depends on a third constraint of BSC that is absent for
non-bodily multisensory perception: PPS. In the present paper,
we define PPS as the part of space that surrounds the different
body parts, which remains anchored to a given body part (arm,
face, trunk) when that body part moves, and where information
related to external stimuli (as signaled by visual or auditory inputs)
interacts with the processing of somatosensory stimuli on the
body. The extent or the boundaries of PPS are defined on the ba-
sis of multisensory responses, as captured by behavioral and
neurophysiological measurements.
PPS has most often been linked to the arm reaching space,
conceived as a sensory-motor interface for hand-object interac-
tions (Brozzoli et al., 2012b; Makin et al., 2012; Maravita et al.,
2003). However, data from patients and healthy volunteers also
described a PPS around the head (Cle´ry et al., 2014; Farne`
et al., 2005; Farne` and La`davas, 2002; La`davas et al., 1998b;
Teneggi et al., 2013) and the trunk (Galli et al., 2015; Noel
et al., 2014, 2015; A.S., unpublished data), suggesting that the
extent of PPS should be defined by the (potential) interactions
between stimuli on the body and objects in the space around it.
Prolonged Multisensory Stimulation Leads to Changes
in Body Ownership, Self-Identification, and Self-
Location: The Embodiment Constraint
Do multisensory stimulations within PPS that induce altered
states of BSC also impact the constraints of multisensory
perception? We propose that specific stimulation patterns, im-
plemented during the different illusory own-body perceptions,
change multisensory integration of bodily signals and shapes
PPS representation, reflecting a fourth constraint for the
neural mechanisms underlying BSC that we call ‘‘embodiment.’’
More specifically, the fourth constraint, which models of BSC
need to account for, is how the synchronous and prolonged
manipulation of multisensory stimulation impacts BSC. In the
described experiments on BSC, subjects are exposed to syn-
chronous visuo-tactile stimulations between their body and an
artificial body, and these are generally applied for several mi-
nutes, inducing the different illusions (rubber-hand, enfacement,
or full-body illusions), which are quantified by behavioral and
brain imaging measurements. The prolonged synchronous stim-
ulations related to the embodiment constraint temporally link
stimuli from different modalities and from the physical body
and another body or object. Embodiment applies when synchro-
nous multisensory bodily signals are integrated over longer
Neuron
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BSC. Importantly, under normal conditions, embodiment applies
for the physical parts of the biological body, which naturally and
continuously receive prolonged and synchronous multisensory
inputs. However, the reviewed bodily illusions (see Makin et al.,
2007; Ehrsson, 2012; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Blanke, 2012
for revisions) and previous work on tool incorporation (Maravita
and Iriki, 2004) show that embodiment can also apply to artificial
objects and tools, whose features and position do not fully over-
lap with those of the biological body. In the rubber hand (Makin
et al., 2007; Ehrsson, 2012), enfacement (Apps and Tsakiris,
2014), and full-body illusion paradigms (Blanke, 2012), despite
spatio-temporal conflicts in basic multisensory processing with
respect to the three other BSC constraints, the embodiment
constraint allows extending BSC to a different object or location
than the biological body, if the period of multisensory stimulation
is long enough. In the following sections, we will link specific
changes in body ownership, self-identification, and self-location
to mechanisms of plasticity in multisensory integration of bodily
signals within the PPS, affecting embodiment.
Studies using the rubber hand illusion have consistently
shown that the integration of visuo-tactile stimuli is determined
by the same proprioceptive, visual, and spatial constraints
determining multisensory bodily integration within PPS. No (or
weaker) illusory hand ownership is induced if the rubber hand
is presented far outside the participant’s hand PPS (Lloyd,
2007), in a spatial position incompatible with the participants’
posture (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Costantini and Haggard, 2007),
or for a visual stimulus whose shape does not resemble a hand
(Tsakiris et al., 2008, 2010). Thus, visuo-tactile integration
inducing the rubber hand illusion is subject to the constraints
determining multisensory integration within the PPS (see
Figure 1C). Illusory ownership can also be evoked for a very
long virtual arm (Kilteni et al., 2012; Armel and Ramachandran,
2003) or different arm colors (Martini et al., 2013), pending that
the virtual limbs were perceived to be connected to the partici-
pant’s body (Perez-Marcos et al., 2012). In addition, illusory
hand ownership occurs not only when visuo-tactile stimulation
on the participant’s hand and on the virtual hand are perfectly
synchronized, but also with a delay shorter that 300ms, whereas
at higher delays the strength of the illusion decays and vanishes
for delays longer than 500 ms (Shimada et al., 2009; see also
Aspell et al., 2010 and Zopf et al., 2010 for temporal factors
affecting multisensory interaction during the full-body illusion
and the rubber hand illusion, respectively).
Other results show that once illusory ownership for the rubber
hand is induced, the processing and integration of stimuli related
to the real and the rubber hand is affected so that administering
a threatening stimulus toward the rubber or virtual hand induces
autonomic responses, as if the real hand was threatened (Armel
and Ramachandran, 2003). Such effects have also been associ-
ated with physiological and perceptual changes in the partici-
pant’s hand, such as reduction of hand temperature (Moseley
et al., 2008), hand temperature sensitivity (Llobera et al., 2013),
and change in immunological reactivity (Barnsley et al., 2011).
Moreover, Zopf et al. (2010) showed the CCE magnitude re-
flected changes in BSC, since visual cues enhanced CCEs
when applied on a rubber hand that was associated with illusoryhand ownership. This result reflects an alteration of multisensory
integration within the PPS due to changes in BSC. Finally, Ferri
et al. (2013) showed that the rubber hand illusion hand can be
obtained even without touching the rubber hand by just present-
ing visual stimuli entering the rubber hand’s PPS.
Less data are available for face ownership but are consistent in
linking the enfacement illusion to multisensory integration within
the face PPS. Cardini et al. (2013) showed that a visual stimulus
occurring on another person’s face (seen in front of the partici-
pant on a computer screen) impacted tactile stimulation on the
participant’s face more strongly after the two faces had received
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation to induce illusory face
ownership. This effect was associated with a change inmultisen-
sory integration within the PPS: Maister et al. (2014) measured
how a dynamic sound moving between the participant and the
other person affected tactile processing of stimuli on the partic-
ipant’s face (as in Canzoneri et al., 2012) and how this depended
on illusory face ownership with the other person’s face. They
found that a sound presented at a specific location far from
the participant’s face, but close to the other person’s face, had
a stronger effect on tactile processing, when the participants
experienced illusory face ownership for the other person’s
face. To summarize, illusory ownership for a hand and face,
due to prolonged stimulation, has been consistently linked to
multisensory integration of bodily signals, based on propriocep-
tive, body-related visual information, PPS, and embodiment
constraints. In case of ownership for specific body parts, we
propose that such multisensory (mainly visuo-tactile) integration
mechanisms concern body-part-specific (hand-centered, head-
centered) representations. Multisensory stimulation involving
larger body sectors, and in particular the trunk region, leads to
alterations of global aspects of BSC, such as self-identification
and self-location.
First experimental manipulations of self-location are reported
by psychologist George Stratton, who performed self-experi-
ments and described subjective changes in visuo-tactile percep-
tion using a portable system that consisted of two mirrors. One
mirror was positioned horizontally above the head and another
small mirror in front of the eyes (at an angle of 45). The topmirror
imaged the person as seen from above and was also reflected in
the small mirror, leading to a projection of the image of Stratton’s
body in front-space. Prolonged usage of this device induced
visuo-tactile sensations characterized by referral of touch to
the visual locations and changes in self-location (Stratton,
1899). More systematic changes in self-location have been
induced by recent studies employing different full-body illusion
paradigms. By using questionnaires, behavioral tasks, mental
imagery or skin conductance response, several studies proved
that it is possible to make participants self-identify with an artifi-
cial body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009, 2011; Ehrsson, 2007;
Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008, 2011; Guterstam et al., 2015; Aspell
et al., 2009, 2010, 2013; Palluel et al., 2011; Ionta et al., 2011;
Pfeiffer et al., 2013, Pome´s and Slater, 2013) and also to induce
changes in self-location. For instance, asking participants to
walk to the position where they have been standing during the
illusion induction (after displacing them), they place themselves
not at the location of their physical body during the experiment,
but either ‘‘in front’’ of or behind that position, depending on theNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 149
Figure 2. Four Constraints Determining Global Aspects of BSC (i.e., Self-Identification and Self-Location)
(A and B) Stimuli applied to an artificial body (with blue shirt) are integratedwith stimuli on one’s physical body (with red or green shirt), if the artificial body is placed
coherently with the posture of the physical body. This change in global BSC does not occur if proprioceptive (and vestibular) information from one’s own and the
artificial body does not match ([A], proprioceptive constraint), or if an object with non-bodily shape is shown ([B], body-related visual information constraint).
(C—E) Prolonged synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation applied to one’s physical body and to the artificial body induces changes in global BSC, extends one’s
own PPS ([C], PPS constraint), and induces self-identification for, and a shift of self-location toward, the artificial body ([D], embodiment constraint). These four
constraints normally determine integration of multisensory body signals for one’s whole body, thus underlying self-identification with the body and normal self-
location at the location of the physical body, within the PPS (E). Red and green body of the participant indicates, respectively, absence or presence of global
aspects of BSC.
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(2009) studied changes in multisensory integration of bodily sig-
nals (CCE) associated to these experimentally induced changes
in BSC. Stronger CCEs were found in the synchronous condi-
tion—inducing self-identification with the avatar and a drift in
self-location toward the avatar’s location. Proprioceptive con-
straints of multisensory integration of bodily signals were also
found to modulate BSC, as investigated in the full-body illusion,
since themagnitude of the CCE, aswell as self-identificationwith
the virtual body, were modulated consistently by leg muscle vi-
bration (inducing proprioceptive noise), but not by arm muscle
vibration (Palluel et al., 2012). Body-related visual information
also impacts on such changes in BSC, as the administration of
visuo-tactile synchronous stroking with a non-bodily object in-
duces no or minimal changes in self-identification and self-loca-
tion (Figure 2B) (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Salomon et al., 2012;
Aspell et al., 2009; Romano et al., 2014). Thus, the embodiment
constraint of BSC—based on the prolonged synchronous visuo-
tactile stimulation—is also present and is associated with illusory
changes in self-identification and self-location. Critically, such
changes have been directly linked with a modulation of trunk-150 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.centered PPS. Noel et al. (2015) measured the PPS size and
the location of PPS boundaries adapted to the full body (while
participants were exposed to synchronous visuo-tactile stroking
to induce the full-body illusion). The PPS was found to extend in
the front-space, toward the avatar’s body, for which illusory self-
identification was experienced. The opposite effect (a contrac-
tion of the PPS) was found in the back-space (and no such
changes were observed in the asynchronous control condition
in front- or back-space). These data show that the boundaries
of PPS during the full-body illusion shift toward the avatar, sug-
gesting that the reshaping of PPS representation mirrored the
experimentally induced changes in BSC and further suggest
that the trunk-centered, whole-body, PPS is referenced to the
experienced location of the self, rather at the location of the
physical body (see Figure 2C). These data show that although
multisensory integration for the body occurs under normal con-
ditions within the PPS, prolonged temporally synchronized stim-
ulation of the body and of a virtual or physical replacement of it
(embodiment, see Figure 2D) alters the constraints of multisen-
sory bodily integration, reshapes PPS, and induces BSC for an
artificial body.
Box 1. Current Status of the Field
BSC depends on the integration of bodily signals from different sensory modalities. As compared to other forms of multisensory
integration involving purely exteroceptive stimuli, multisensory processing of bodily signals for BSC is determined by four compu-
tational constraints.
d It depends on proprioceptive and vestibular inputs signaling the location of body parts and of the whole body in space (pro-
prioceptive constraint).
d It depends on visual information about the shape and the structure of the body (body-related visual information constraint).
d Normally it occurs within a limited space surrounding the body, termed PPS (PPS constraint).
d Prolongedmultisensory stimulation manipulating the spatio-temporal coherence of bodily signals alters BSC, by reshaping the
PPS boundaries and inducing BSC for non-corporeal objects (embodiment constraint).
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Aspects of BSC
We summarize what is known about the constraints determining
multisensory mechanisms of BSC in Box 1. We note that,
although the four constraints of BSC (proprioception, visual
body-related information, PPS, and embodiment) are present
for hand, face, and trunk, the mechanisms of multisensory
perception of stimuli at the trunk and head are based on different
mechanisms that are not present for hand-related perception
and hand-related aspects of BSC. These differences are re-
flected in differences in tactile properties; for instance, the tactile
spatial resolution at the fingers and hand is very high, whereas it
is very low for the trunk, since the size of tactile receptive fields is
small at finger/hand and large at the trunk (see next section).
Moreover, the impact of vestibular cues is much more important
for head-related processing than for arm-related processing,
where proprioceptive cues are more relevant. Other differences
are the limited direct visual access we have to our face and back
as compared to the highly visible limbs and the differences in
movement properties for hand and trunk (i.e., hand movements
versus head or full-body movements) (Kannape and Blanke,
2012; Kannape et al., 2010).
The importance of these distinct bodily signals for global
aspects of BSCare prominent for self-identification and self-loca-
tion, asdistinguished frombody-part ownership. Thus,while it has
been shown that body ownership relies on multisensory signals
from smaller circumscribed body regions (hand, face), self-identi-
fication relies onmoreglobalmultisensory signals, encompassing
largeparts of thebody (or the entire body). Accordingly, themech-
anisms involved in self-identification and self-location rely heavily
onproprioceptive and vestibular signals, and relatedmultisensory
bodily processes are referenced to the trunk. Finally, while illusory
hand ownership occurs only when the hand is within the PPS, illu-
sory self-identification and a shift of self-location can be induced
for an artificial body presented farther away, to which the partici-
pant’s PPS extends. Thus, we propose that neural processes of
global BSC related to the trunk are fundamental for self-identifica-
tion and self-location and are different from neural processes en-
codingBSC for circumscribed body parts. Only the former lead to
the experience of an organism to be located within a particular
portion of space in the world (self-location) and to identify with
that portion of space. Most of the time, that position of space co-
incides with the organism’s physical body (self-identification),
because multisensory bodily inputs, under normal conditions,
are all coherently related to the same physical object, thebody—‘‘the same old body, always there’’ to use William James’
words (James, 1890)—which is then experienced as one’s own
body and where the PPS representation is centered. However, if
multisensory bodily inputs are manipulated, using specific con-
flicts under specific constraints, it is possible to induce states of
BSC for other objects or spatial locations, reshaping PPS repre-
sentation and altering self-identification and self-location.
Major Neurophysiological Properties of BSC
Bimodal and Multimodal Neurons
Next we focus on a particular set of neurons, bimodal and multi-
modal neurons, located in posterior parietal cortex, posterior
insula, and premotor cortex (PMC) of non-human primates
and highlight their main neurophysiological properties related
to multisensory bodily perception and BSC. The key feature of
bimodal neurons is that they respond not only to stimuli in one
modality, such as tactile cues, but also to visual, auditory, and
proprioceptive signals. Following seminal work by Vernon
Mountcastle (Mountcastle et al., 1975, 1995), subsequent single
unit studies in awake, behaving monkeys have consistently
described several populations of bimodal and trimodal neurons
processingmultisensory bodily inputs. These neurons aremainly
located in the posterior parietal cortex, in particular in a region
ranging from the postcentral sulcus (at the junction between
the superior parietal and the inferior parietal lobules) to more
posterior regions along the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and involve
area 5, area 7, and area VIP. Frontal cortex, in particular ventral
PMC (area 6), also harbors bimodal and trimodal neurons pro-
cessing multisensory inputs (see Figure 3). These fronto-parietal
areas are strongly interconnected, directly or indirectly project
to the cortico-spinal tracts, and together are considered to
form a fronto-parietal multisensory-motor network supporting
sensory-motor functions (Rizzolatti et al., 1997, 2002; Colby,
1998; Grefkes and Fink, 2005; Andersen, 1997).
Typically, these neurons have a tactile receptive field (RF)
covering a relatively large part of the skin that is centered on a
specific body part. Importantly, these neurons also respond to
visual stimulation (Duhamel et al., 1998; Fogassi et al., 1996;
Graziano et al., 1994, 1997; Rizzolatti et al., 1981; Avillac et al.,
2005) or auditory stimulation (Graziano et al., 1999; Schlack
et al., 2005) (bimodal neurons), and still others respond to all
threemodalities (trimodal neurons). Many of them receive propri-
oceptive inputs, and some of them are active during body
movements. The neuronal responses (i.e., spike discharge
rate) are enhanced (or depressed) when bimodal stimuliNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 151
Figure 3. Neurophysiological Mechanisms
of BSC in the Macaque
(A–C) Upper panel: main brain regions, dimen-
sions, and location of multisensory receptive fields
of multimodal neurons integrating body-related
multisensory inputs within the PPS in themacaque
([A], PPS constraint). Lower panel: multisensory
neurons may respond to stimulation related to an
artificial arm, but this effect depends on whether
the artificial hand is placed coherently or not with
the posture of the physical hand ([B], propriocep-
tive constraint) and on whether an visual stimulus
with bodily or non-bodily shape is shown ([C],
body-related visual information constraint).
(D and E) Some multisensory neurons originally
respond only to stimuli related to the real arm (D)
and not to an artificial arm; however, prolonged
synchronous visuo-tactile of the real and the arti-
ficial arm makes these neurons responding also
to the artificial arm ([E], embodiment constraint).
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to non-stimulation trials (baseline neuronal discharge rate) or to
unimodal conditions (unimodal visual or unimodal tactile stimula-
tion). Different nonlinear sub-, super-, or additive mechanisms
have been described (Avillac et al., 2007), and these neural activ-
ity modulations are a prominent feature of multisensory integra-
tion (i.e., Stein and Stanford, 2008). Integration is usually optimal
when stimuli are in temporal synchrony and spatially congruent,
similarly as for cortical regions processing auditory-visual stimuli
(in superior temporal sulcus regions or superior colliculus; see152 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Stein and Stanford, 2008). Frontal and
parietal bimodal neurons are particularly
sensitive to dynamic stimuli, as their firing
rate increases in response to external (vi-
sual or auditory) cues approaching the
body (Graziano et al., 1997; Graziano,
1999) and are sensitive to the velocity of
looming stimuli (the boundaries of their
receptive fields extend in space when
presented with fast, as compared to
slow, visual stimuli; Fogassi et al., 1996).
Receptive Field Properties of
Bimodal and Multimodal Neurons
At least four distinct fronto-parietal func-
tional networks have been described,
based on their anatomical and functional
properties, compatible with their involve-
ment in specific sensory-motor functions
(see Rizzolatti et al., 1997, 2002; Colby,
1998). Here we will focus on area F4 in
the ventral-PMC and on the fundus of
the IPS (ventral intraparietal area [VIP]),
which, together with neighboring parietal
areas 5 and 7b, host multisensory neu-
rons whose multisensory properties
have been most directly linked to bodily
processing and BSC.
Compared to tactile receptive fields in
lower-tier parietal regions such as S1,the size of the tactile receptive fields of bimodal neurons is large
andmay cover an entire hand/arm, the head or trunk, or an entire
body half. Somemay cover bilateral body regions. The size of the
visual or auditory receptive fields typically matches that of the
tactile receptive field, and the different receptive fields overlap
spatially and extend from the body for varying distances. For
instance, in ventral PMC, most neurons have a tactile receptive
field covering the arm, but can also cover the shoulder, upper
trunk, or face. Visual receptive fields (Fogassi et al., 1996; Gra-
ziano et al., 1997) of such PMC neurons also have variable
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extend into space by approximately 30 cm (Graziano et al.,
1999). In most VIP neurons, the tactile receptive fields are usually
centered on the head (Duhamel et al., 1998; Avillac et al., 2005),
but have also been reported for the upper trunk (chest), shoulder,
or arm (Iriki et al., 1996). Visual (Duhamel et al., 1998; Bremmer
et al., 2001a) and auditory (Schlack et al., 2005) receptive fields
in area VIP are usually limited to the upper part of visual or audi-
tory space and cover a distance of 10–60 cm from the body sur-
face, almost always on the same side of space as the tactile
receptive field.Most bimodal neurons in area 7b have even larger
tactile receptive fields and may cover the arm, the head, and the
trunk, and sometimes even the whole body bilaterally. Again, the
size and location of their visual (or auditory) receptive fields are
congruent with the dimensions of the tactile receptive field and
also extend bilaterally over large regions of the visual field, some-
times covering more than 1 m (Leinonen, 1980; Leinonen et al.,
1979, 1980; Leinonen and Nyman, 1979; Hyva¨rinen, 1981; Gra-
ziano and Gross, 1995; Jiang et al., 2013). Thus, the receptive
fields of these bi- and tri-modal neurons cover body-parts or
larger parts of the body surface extending over portions of
PPS and are proportional in size. At the anatomical level, upper
extremities are represented mainly in PMC, the face in VIP,
and the trunk in area 7b (Figure 3A).
Body-Part-Centered Multisensory Properties
Next to their sensitivity to tactile, visual, and auditory signals,
these neurons also integrate proprioceptive and sometimes
vestibular signals, which are important inputs allowing to anchor
their multisensory receptive fields to the different body parts
and to maintain spatial congruency between visual, auditory,
and tactile receptive fields. Indeed, a critical feature of these neu-
rons is that their visual (and auditory) receptive fields remain in
spatial alignment with the tactile receptive field, despite active
or passive movements of the arm, head, or trunk. If the body
part (e.g., the arm) to which the tactile receptive field is anchored
moves, the spatial location of the visual or auditory receptive field
shifts congruently from the initial spatial position to its new loca-
tion (Fogassi et al., 1996; Graziano et al., 1997), compatible with
the importanceof proprioceptive signals highlighted inbehavioral
studies of multisensory bodily processing in humans (La`davas
et al., 1998a; Spence et al., 2004; Serino et al., 2011a). Thus,
multimodal neurons encode multisensory bodily stimuli in body-
centered reference frames (i.e., arm-centered, head-centered,
trunk-centered) by anchoring the different receptive fields to a
given body part. In order to study the relative contribution of pro-
prioceptive and visual inputs to arm-centered neurons, Graziano
(1999) recorded the activity of ventral PMC neurons with multi-
sensory arm-centered receptive fields and exposed a monkey
to the following conflicting visuo-proprioceptive conditions: the
monkey saw a visual stimulus that approached either its real
arm or a fake arm, which was placed either congruently or incon-
gruently with the real arm posture. The firing rates of the neurons
to approaching stimuli varied as a function of the position not only
of the monkey’s real arm but also of the fake arm (see also Gra-
ziano et al., 2000 for similar coding by parietal neurons). Thus,
body-related visual information, as signaled by the fake arm, in
addition to proprioception of the real arm,modulates the location
of multisensory receptive fields of these neurons in a similar wayas shown for multisensory perception in healthy (Pavani et al.,
2000) and brain-damaged (Farne` and La`davas, 2002) individuals.
Since sensory stimuli coming from an external object are
initially processed in sensory-dependent reference frames (e.g.,
visual stimuli in eye-centered, auditory stimuli in head-centered,
tactile stimuli in body-centered frames), their coordinates need to
be aligned for integration. To this aim, the samestimuli are coded,
or remapped, with respect to different body-centered reference
frames (Colby, 1998; Andersen, 1997; Rizzolatti et al., 1997; Se-
reno and Huang 2014; see also Deneve and Pouget, 2004; Ma
et al., 2006; Pouget et al., 2002). The computations necessary
for coding stimuli from different modalities in body-centered
reference frames differ depending on the concerned body parts
to which external stimuli are referenced to (Andersen and Buneo,
2002; Cohen and Andersen, 2002; Pouget et al., 2002), compat-
iblewith the proprioceptive constraint of BSCand the differences
between hand- and trunk-related aspects of BSC. Thus, in order
to construct a visual receptive field that is anchored to the arm, it
is necessary to take into account theposition of thearm relative to
the eye and the head, as well as the position of the arm relative to
the trunk. Accordingly, fronto-parietal multisensory neurons
mapping the peri-hand space show responses that are modu-
lated by eye position, head position, and arm position (Graziano
et al., 1997; Fogassi et al., 1996). In contrast, in order to construct
a visual receptive field that is anchored to thehead, it is necessary
to take into account the position of the eye relative to the head
and that of the head with respect to the trunk (while the position
of the arm with respect to the trunk is irrelevant in this context).
Most neurons in VIP, mapping the peri-head PPS, have been
shown to modulate their responses depending on the position
of the eyes and the head, but not of the arm (see Duhamel
et al., 1998; Avillac et al., 2005; Graziano and Gross, 1995).
Finally, for a trunk-centered spatial representation, head position
and arm position are irrelevant. In fact, responses of area 7b or
VIP neurons,mapping the trunk or thewhole body, are notmodu-
lated by arm and head movements (Leinonen and Nyman, 1979;
Leinonen et al., 1979; Hyva¨rinen, 1981; Graziano and Gross,
1995; Jiang et al., 2013) (see Figure 3A).
Multisensory Integration in PPS and Its Relevance
for BSC at the Level of Single Neurons: Body Ownership
and Self-Identification
In a series of elegant neurophysiological experiments, Graziano
and Gross described multimodal neurons in area 5 that come
closest of being the neurophysiological basis of BSC in animals
(Graziano et al., 2000). These authors applied conditions ofmulti-
sensory stimulation (similar to those of the rubber hand illusion in
humans) and tested the response properties in monkey area 5.
Presenting the animal either with a fake hand or the animal’s
hand (placed either on the right or the left side of space), several
neurons responded preferentially when the arm occupied one
side of space; bimodal visuo-proprioceptive neurons coded
either the location of the physical arm (proprioception), the
position of the fake arm (vision), or both (visuo-proprioceptive
integration) (see also Graziano, 1999). Moreover, visuo-proprio-
ceptive coding in area 5 neurons depended on whether a fake
arm was seen or not (i.e., a box did not affect the cell’s
responses; body-related visual constraint of BSC; Figure 3C)
and onwhether the fake handwas shown in a physically possibleNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 153
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constraint of BSC; Figure 3B). Most importantly, Graziano et al.
(2000) showed that prolonged visuo-tactile stroking—similarly
as that used to induce the rubber hand illusion—affected
the tuning properties of these neurons. Selecting neurons whose
response preference depended on the location of the real (pro-
prioceptive), but not of the fake (visual information), arm, they
applied synchronous visuo-tactile stroking repeatedly to the
monkey’s hidden real and visible fake arm. Re-evaluating the
visual tuning of the same neurons immediately afterward, these
neurons were now tuned to the visual location of the fake arm
(a coding which was absent before visuo-tactile stimulation;
embodiment constraint of BSC; see Figure 3E). As in the rubber
hand illusion in healthy humans, such neuronal tuning changes
were absent after asynchronous visuo-tactile stroking. We
argue that changes in body ownership that are induced by syn-
chronized visuo-tactile stroking during the rubber hand illusion
involve comparable neurophysiological changes and shifts in
the spatial characteristics of hand-centered multimodal neurons
in human parietal or PMC areas (see Makin et al., 2008). Analo-
gously, we argue that changes in self-identification and self-
location induced in the full-body illusion (i.e., Lenggenhager
et al., 2007) that are associated with changes in the boundary
of trunk PPS (Noel et al., 2015) rely on similar neurophysiological
tuning changes, but for trunk- and not hand-centered neurons,
especially in areas VIP or area 7b. We thus speculate that the vi-
suo-tactile stroking procedures described for the arm, face, and
trunk and affecting BSC change the neural responses of multi-
modal neurons, resulting in a displacement or enlargement of
their visual or auditory receptive fields, so that they also encode
the seen hand, face, or whole body, even if presented at spatial
location beyond the body’s boundaries (see Iriki et al., 2001). In
other words, appropriate manipulations, implementing specific
spatio-temporal conflicts in multisensory signals, might alter
the standard constraints typically ruling multisensory integration
of bodily inputs, thus re-shaping PPS representation and
inducing specific and predicted changes in BSC.
Similar links between multisensory integration, body percep-
tion, and BSC in animals can be proposed for face perception
(Chang et al., 2015). These authors assessed self-face recogni-
tion in monkeys by means of the mirror-mark test (Gallop,
1970).Usually,monkeys fail topass the test, indicating apotential
lack of self-awareness (at least as tested by this procedure; see
Suddendorf and Butler, 2013 and Rochat and Zahavi, 2011 or
discussions). However, Chang and colleagues observed that
monkeys passed the test after exposure to multisensory bodily
stimulation, which consisted in projecting a laser light of mildly
irritating facial tactile stimulation, the monkey could observe
through a mirror. Such facial somatosensory stimulation was
coupled with synchronous visual stimulation of the face (seen in
the mirror), mimicking the enfacement illusion in humans (Tsaki-
ris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010). Crucially, after prolonged visuo-
tactile training in front of the mirror, the trained monkeys showed
behavioral evidence of self-recognition and exhibited sponta-
neous untrained behaviors that were directed toward their body
(potential behavioral evidence for BSC). We speculate that
such synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation during the training
may have activated face-selective PPS neurons in VIP and that154 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.changes in the tuning of these neuronsmay have resulted in suc-
cessful self-face recognition (Chang et al., 2015). Ishida et al.
(2010) reported that VIP bimodal face-centered neurons, which
responded to tactile and visual stimulation approaching themon-
key’s face, also discharged when a visual stimulus approached
the experimenter’s face. As the latter condition is comparable
to looking into amirror, it is possible that the systematic and pro-
longed activation of such bimodal neurons due to the mirror vi-
suo-tactile training as used by Chang and colleaguesmay estab-
lish new systematic links between the seen face (mirror) and the
monkey’s own face. By repeating comparable experiments as
described by Chang et al. (2015) for the face and by Graziano
et al. (2000) for the hand, but by exposing monkeys to conditions
of multisensory stimulation of the full-body illusion while
recordingneural activities frommultisensory areas indifferent an-
imal species, one may reveal the detailed neural machinery of
self-identification and self-location not only in monkeys but also
in lower species suchascats (Wallace andStein, 2007) or rodents
(Raposo et al., 2012; Olcese et al., 2013); even in Drosophila the
investigation ofmultisensory signals that are of relevance forBSC
is possible (see e.g., Gepner et al., 2015).
Major Brain Regions of BSC in Humans
In the following section, we present neuroimaging data suggest-
ing how multisensory integration of bodily signals in PPS, rele-
vant for BSC, is implemented in the human brain.
Hand Ownership
Many studies have focused on the processing of hand-centered
multisensory bodily signals. Makin et al. (2007) showed that re-
gions along the IPS, in the lateral occipital complex (LOC), and
the ventral PMC were activated more strongly when a stimulus
approached the participants’ hand (near condition) as compared
to the same visual stimulation presented at a distance of 70 cm
from the hand (far condition). This differential activation was
further modulated by proprioceptive hand position signals as
well as body-related visual information, compatible with coding
in a hand-centered reference frame. Differential near-far activa-
tion (i.e., within or outside the hand PPS) in IPS was also present
when viewing a fake hand at the near location (even if the partic-
ipant’s real hand was retracted), but was absent in LOC and
ventral PMC, if participants positioned their hand far from the
location of the near stimulus. These activation patterns, espe-
cially in IPS (dependence on visual information as occurring
near versus far from the hand and dependence on propriocep-
tive and visual bodily information), are compatible with the pro-
prioceptive and body-related visual constraints highlighted by
behavioral and neurophysiological studies. Gentile et al. (2011)
further showed that that these areas do not only process signals
that are on or close to the arm but also preferentially integrate
multisensory stimuli, when occurring within the arm-centered
PPS. They compared neural activity associated with unimodal
tactile stimulation of the hand, unimodal visual stimulation near
the hand, and bimodal (visuo-tactile) stimulation within the
PPS. Moreover, areas in posterior and inferior parietal cortex
and PMC showed additive response to bimodal, as compared
to unimodal stimulation (see also Makin et al., 2007). Other re-
gions in the anterior IPS, dorsal PMC, insula, and putamen
showed non-linear, super-additive responses, similarly to
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Stein and Stanford, 2008).
Such multisensory integration effects further depend on the
spatial and temporal coherence between visuo-tactile inputs.
Gentile et al. (2013) joined tactile stimulation of the participant’s
real hand with the visual presentation of a virtual hand while
manipulating spatial congruency (i.e., manipulating the direction
of visual and tactile stimulation along the proximo-distal or
medio-lateral hand axis) and temporal synchrony of stimulation
(i.e., with synchronous or asynchronous visuo-tactile stimula-
tion): activation in IPS, in ventral and dorsal PMC, in LOC, and
in the cerebellum varied as a function of the spatial and temporal
congruency of visuo-tactile hand stimulation and were modu-
lated by proprioceptive and visual signals related to the hand,
reflecting the spatio-temporal constraints of multisensory bodily
integration. (Brozzoli et al., 2011) used fMRI adaption to identify
multisensory arm-related neuronal activations responding to
stimulation within the PPS; they found that IPS, the inferior
parietal lobe (supramarginal gyrus), the dorsal and ventral
PMC, the cerebellum, and the putamen show reduced activation
(adaptation) to consecutive visual stimulation near the hand,
but not for consecutive far stimuli, compatible with their role in
multisensory perception within PPS. Taken together, these neu-
roimaging studies highlight a network of premotor and parietal
areas (as well as the putamen and the cerebellum) associated
with the integration of tactile hand-centered stimulation with
visual stimuli occurring within the hand PPS, depending on the
first three constraints of BSC (i.e., proprioceptive, body-related
visual information, and PPS contraints).
Further neuroimaging studies linked this PPS hand-centered
system to arm-related BSC, and to hand ownership, in particular.
Prolonged synchronous visuo-tactile stroking of the real and a
fake hand (placed in a plausible posture), inducing illusory
hand ownership, was found to activate ventral PMC (Ehrsson
et al., 2004), IPS, and the cerebellum (Ehrsson et al., 2004,
2005) (i.e., the same areas showing de-activation in case of
incongruent visuo-tactile hand stimulation and decreased hand
ownership) (Gentile et al. (2013). Others described ownership-
related activation in the supplementary motor area (Ehrsson,
2007) and posterior parietal regions, including the inferior parie-
tal and superior parietal lobule (Lloyd et al., 2006), by showing
that those areas responded to threatening stimuli directed to
the fake hand. Moreover, the strength of hand ownership (as
measured by questionnaire ratings) was found to correlate with
activity in anterior insular, anterior cingulate cortices (Ehrsson,
2007), PMC, and cerebellum (Ehrsson et al., 2004). These find-
ings were extended by Tsakiris et al. (2007), who reported that
activity in right posterior insula and sensorimotor cortices (pre-
central and postcentral gyri) was associated with illusory hand
ownership and that activity in the right insula and left somatosen-
sory cortex correlated with proprioceptive drift. We note that
hand ownership has also been manipulated by applying finger-
specific stimulations (i.e., numbness illusion) and has been asso-
ciated with circumscribed activity in sub-regions of primary so-
matosensory cortex (Dieguez et al., 2009; Martuzzi et al., 2015).
Inducing illusory ownership for a fake hand through prolonged
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation recodes the space around
the rubber hand as peri-hand space.While bilateral IPS and PMCactivations normally show an adaptation effect for consecutive
visual stimuli presented close to the participant’s real hand (Broz-
zoli et al., 2011), this effect was not obtained if repeated visual
stimulations were presented close to a fake hand that was posi-
tioned in contralateral space. Yet, adaptation effects in IPS and
PMC were evoked by stimuli near the fake hand when additional
visuo-tactile strokingwas used to induce illusory hand ownership
for the contralateral fake hand (Brozzoli et al., 2012a). This sug-
gests that both areas, normally representing the participant’s
PPS, also coded the space surrounding the illusory own fake
hand, extending earlier single cell responses in area 5 and PMC
(Graziano et al., 1999, 2000) to subjective hand ownership.
Taken together, these human neuroimaging studies highlight
two main regions (PMC and PPC), within a larger network of
cortical areas (including insula, primary somatosensory cortex,
LOC, TPJ, supplementary motor area, anterior cingulate cortex,
and cerebellum), involved in the integration of multisensory arm-
related signals (see Figure 4A). Human PMC and IPS have
been consistently found to integrate multisensory stimuli within
the hand PPS, based on the spatial and temporal laws of
multisensory perception as well as the four constraints of BSC
(proprioception, hand-related visual signals, PPS, and embodi-
ment). Activity in these regions depends on the spatio-temporal
congruency between the processing of these hand-related multi-
sensory inputs and is consistentwith the reviewedbehavioral data
in humans and the neurophysiological data in PMC and area 5 in
non-human primates. These data support the hypothesis that
the tuning properties of bi- or tri-modal neurons, mapping the
peri-hand space, in the PMC-IPS network (Graziano et al., 1999,
2000; see also Makin et al., 2008) define ownership for one’s
own hand, or for an artificial replacement of it (embodiment), by
integratingmultiple hand-relatedsignalswithin thePPSon theba-
sis of proprioceptive and visual constraints (see Figure 4B).
Self-Face Perception and Face Ownership
An early study on humans showed that neural activity associated
with tactile stimulation on one’s face overlapped with activity
evoked by visual or auditory stimuli approaching the face in
three cortical regions: IPS, ventral PMC, and lateral inferior parts
of the postcentral gyrus (Bremmer et al., 2001b). Based on this
response profile, Bremmer and colleagues proposed that the
IPS region was the human homolog of monkey area VIP, a pro-
posal further corroborated by (Sereno and Huang, 2006), who
found that the same anatomical IPS region contained aligned
maps of tactile and visual stimuli in the peri-face region and that
this activity encoded stimuli in a face-centered reference frame.
More recently,Cardini et al. (2011) showed that the IPS/VIP region
was activated when participants received tactile stimulation on
their face,while viewinganother facebeing touched.Visuo-tactile
evoked IPS/VIP activity in this study did not differ if participants
viewed their own face being touched (as in the mirror) or another
person’s face. Ventral PMC was also activated by visuo-tactile
face stimulation and was found to encode face identity.
Concerning BSC and the particular case of the enfacement
illusion (Tsakiris et al., 2008; Sforza et al., 2010; Apps et al.,
2015), if was shown that prolonged synchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation of the face, as compared to asynchronous stimula-
tion, significantly activated ventral IPS, temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), and an extrastriate visual face region in the inferiorNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 155
Figure 4. Brain Regions Integrating
Multisensory Bodily Inputs and Implied in
BSC in the Human Brain
(A) Brain areas selectively responding to multi-
sensory inputs within the PPS around the hand
(red), face (blue) or trunk (green).
(B) Brain areas active during manipulations of
BSC, underlying ownership for the hand (red)
or face (blue), self-identification (green), or self-
location (yellow). Each dot represents an activa-
tion site as identified by the studies reviewed in
section 4. The colored shadows highlight clusters
of activations.
Neuron
Perspectiveoccipital gyrus (occipital face area; (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Apps
et al., 2012). Activation in all three regions was further correlated
with the strength of the enfacement illusion. The data from these
studies converge on a key role for posterior parietal cortex (IPS/
VIP) within a larger network of cortical regions, including PMC,
inferior postcentral gyrus, TPJ, and occipital face area, in the
integration of multisensory face-related signals (see Figure 4A).
In posterior parietal cortex within IPS, especially area VIP con-
tains bimodal and trimodal neurons mapping the face PPS as
described in animal studies (Duhamel et al., 1998; Avillac et al.,
2005; Schlack et al., 2005). This area both in humans and inmon-
keys preferentially responds not only to tactile stimulation on the
face and visual (or auditory) stimulation approaching one’s own
face but also to the face of other individuals (Ishida et al.,
2010; Cardini et al., 2011). Moreover, activation patterns in
area VIP change after prolonged visuo-tactile stimulation of
one’s own and another person’s face inducing face-related
changes in BSC (Apps et al., 2015) (see Figure 4B).
This face-related IPS/VIP region likely overlaps with the hand-
related areas (see Figures 3 and 4). We note, however, that less
information is available on how multisensory responses in face-
specific areas is modulated by proprioceptive and visual inputs
related to the face, as shown for hand-centered areas. Thismight
be the case because face and hand rely on different anatomical
and functional constraints. Direct visual signals from the own
face are absent or rare (i.e., not available without a mirror or
related technology), whereas the arm and hand are often in our
visual fields. Moreover, proprioceptive input is also different,
given the axial head system involved in neck proprioception156 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.(head and face), the strongly lateralized
hand proprioception system for arm and
hand position, and the different degrees
of freedom in movements for both
different body parts. Accordingly, vestib-
ular inputs are strongly recruited for face-
related multisensory processing, and
indeed, monkey VIP regions representing
the face process not only visual, tactile, or
auditory stimuli in face PPS but also
vestibular inputs signaling head motion
(Bremmer et al., 2002). We argue that
the tuning properties of multimodal neu-
rons in VIP and other face-encoding IPS
regions define face ownership, accord-
ingly with the four major constraints ofBSC described before. However, the role of the different sensory
inputs and constraints vary between hand and face representa-
tion and ownership. In the latter case, vestibular inputs have a
strong role in determining face orientation (in addition to propri-
oceptive signals that are of importance for hand and face).
Furthermore, visual inputs are prominently related to process vi-
sual features about the face—as a stronger hallmark of self-iden-
tity—than signaling face orientation.
Self-Identification and Self-Location
Human brain regions integrating multisensory signals concern-
ing the trunk have also been investigated. Huang et al. (2012)
administered tactile stimulation on the face, shoulders, hands,
legs, and toes while concurrently stimulating different sectors
of the visual field and found a general overlap of activity induced
by tactile stimulation of each body part and the visual stimulation
of spatially congruent sectors of the visual field (i.e., head tactile
stimulation with upper visual field; leg tactile stimulation with
lower visual field). Visuo-tactile maps of different body parts
were identified in the superior posterior parietal cortex: the
face representation was located within the IPS/VIP region
described in the previous section, whereas the representation
of the lower body parts was located more medially and posteri-
orly, and the finger and hand representations more laterally and
anteriorly see Figure 4A).
In order to study the brain mechanisms of self-identification,
Petkova et al. (2011) combined fMRI with the body-swap illusion,
whereby participants receive prolonged tactile stimulation on
their abdomenwhile viewing amannequin through anHMDbeing
touched at the same body location. This stimulation induces
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viewpoint of a camera mounted on the head of the virtual body
(third-person viewpoint; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; see also
Slater et al., 2010; Maselli and Slater, 2013 for effects of changes
in viewpoint during full-body illusions). fMRI data revealed IPS
and ventral PMC activations when tactile information applied to
the participant’s body was spatially congruent and temporally
synchronouswith the seen stimulation of the virtual body, and ac-
tivity modulation in ventral PMC (but not IPS) was correlated with
thestrengthof illusoryownership for thevirtual body (assessedby
post-scan questionnaires). In a series of follow-up experiments,
Ehrsson and colleagues investigated whether and how such illu-
sory body ownership differs in its underlying neural mechanisms
fromownership for body parts (Gentile et al., 2015; Petkova et al.,
2011). To this aim, visuo-tactile stimulation was applied to
different parts (abdomen, chest, or legs) of the participant’s
body and to the seen virtual body.During prolonged synchronous
visuo-tactile stimulation, illusory touch was perceived as arising
from the mannequin’s body, regardless of the stimulated body
part, with no difference in the strength of the illusion, suggesting
that illusory bodily feelings could be obtained by co-stimulating
different bodyparts of theparticipant and the virtual body (Gentile
et al., 2015). Such effects were not obtained by stimulating a rub-
ber hand detached from themannequin and placed in an implau-
sible posture. By using multivoxel pattern analysis, the authors
found that ventral PMCactivity discriminated betweenprolonged
synchronous and asynchronous visuo-tactile simulation (inde-
pendently from the stimulatedbodypart), and it was not activated
for a detached rubber hand (Petkova et al., 2011; Gentile et al.,
2015). Other portions of the ventral PMC, IPS, LOC, and putamen
showed more selective responses for synchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation of specific body parts.
Another fMRI study used the full-body illusion (Ionta et al.,
2011) to study global changes in BSC, and found that self-
identification with a virtual body is associated with activation
of the TPJ (see below) and the middle-inferior temporal cortex.
The latter activation in middle-inferior temporal cortex partially
overlapped with the extrastriate body area (Astafiev et al.,
2004; Downing et al., 2001; Grossman and Blake, 2002), a region
involved in the multisensory processing of human bodies (Orlov
et al., 2010). No activations related to body ownership were
observed in PMC and IPS in the study performed by Ionta et al.,
(2011). Differently from the standard body-swap illusion, the
full-body illusion has also been shown to induce changes in
self-location (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Serino et al.,
2013), which were found to be associated with gamma band
oscillations in the right TPJ and alpha band oscillations in
the medial prefrontal cortex (Lenggenhager et al., 2011) (see
Figure 4B). Interestingly, if the prolonged stimulation used to
induce the full-body illusion is performed while participants are
lying, as during fMRI, and view a virtual body that was filmed
from an elevated position, changes in self-location are associ-
ated to changes in the experienced direction of participants’
first-person perspective (see also Pfeiffer et al., 2013). Critically,
activity at the TPJ, peaking in the posterior superior temporal
gyri, the parietal operculum, and the posterior insula, was associ-
ated with changes in self-location and in the experienced
direction of first-person perspective induced by the full-body illu-sion at individual-subject level. In particular, despite identical
prolonged visuo-tactile stimulation, half of the participants
experienced looking upward toward the virtual body (up-looking
first-person perspective), and half experienced looking down on
the virtual body (down-looking first-person perspective). These
subjective perspectival changes in the experienced direction of
the first-person perspective were associated with consistent
changes in self-location: up-looking participants reported an
elevation (drift) in self-location during synchronous stroking,
from an initially lower initial self-location; down-looking
participants reported theopposite downwarddrift froman initially
higher self-location. TPJ activity reflected these differential
changes during synchronous versus asynchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation, suggesting that TPJ processing reflects self-location
and depends on the experienced direction of the first-person
perspective, compatible with clinical data (Blanke et al., 2002;
Heydrich and Blanke, 2013; De Ridder et al., 2007).
Additional functional connectivity analysis by Ionta et al. (2014)
showed that the TPJ regions are bilaterally connected to
other regions integrating multisensory inputs within the PPS,
such as the IPS/VIP, the ventral PMC, extrastriate visual regions
(extrastriate body area), the supplementary motor area, and the
insula. Interestingly, the pattern of functional connectivity from
the TPJ to the insula and the supplementary motor area varied
during visuo-tactile stimulation, and reflected experimentally-
induced changes in self-location and first-person perspective.
The involvement of the insula in BSC and self-location is in line
with the prominent involvement of the insula neurons in the pro-
cessing of bodily multisensory signals (Craig, 2002, 2009; Critch-
ley, 2004; Critchley et al., 2004), including vestibular signals (In-
dovina et al., 2005; Mazzola et al., 2014). The insula is also the
primary region processing interoceptive signals (Craig, 2002;
Critchley et al., 2004) and has recently been shown to mediate
changes in self-identification and self-location based on car-
dio-visual stimulation in the full-body illusion (Aspell et al.,
2013; Ronchi et al., 2015), illusory own-body perceptions due
to interoceptive-exteroceptive disintegration in neurological pa-
tients (Heydrich and Blanke, 2013) and hand ownership (Tsakiris
et al., 2007). Thus this brain region, by processing and integrating
multisensory signals from the outside and the inside of the body,
may play a primary role in self-consciousness, as suggested by
recent reviews (Craig, 2002, 2009; Seth, 2013).
Finally, in a recent study, Guterstam et al. (2015) used the
body-swap illusion and combined visuo-tactile stimulation
(of the participant’s abdomen) with different visual viewpoints
from where the mannequin’s body and the room were seen.
This was done to induce changes in self-location (and self-iden-
tification). Participants experienced illusory self-location at
different places in the scanner room, depending on the manne-
quin’s viewpoint (as assessed by questionnaires), and this was
reflected by hippocampal, posterior cingulate, and IPS activa-
tions (further modulated by visuo-tactile synchrony). Moreover,
functional connectivity between posterior cingulate cortex and
IPS correlated with the experienced self-location.
To conclude, neuroimaging studies in humans suggest that
self-identification recruits a network of multisensory brain areas
located in the posterior parietal cortex (IPS/VIP region) and
PMC. These areas in IPS and PMC, which contain bimodal andNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 157
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connected with more lateral, temporo-occipital regions (LOC;
processing high-level visual andmultisensory information related
to the body), with the insular cortex (processing interoceptive
bodily signals), andwithmore lateral regions at the TPJ, including
posterior insula and parietal operculum (receiving important pro-
jections from the vestibular system). We argue that these trunk-
centered activations related to self-identification are based on
neuronal populations and regions that partially overlap, but are
anatomically and functionally distinct from arm-related aspects
of BSC (hand ownership), containing neurons with multisensory
receptive fields that are anchored to large body regions, encom-
passing the right or left hemibody, the upper or lower body half, or
in somecases the entire body surface (Graziano andGross, 1995;
Duhamel et al., 1998; Leinonen et al., 1979; Hyva¨rinen, 1981).
Face ownership activations are likely an intermediate case be-
tween hand- and trunk-centered activations, overlapping with
hand, but particularly with trunk- and body-related ownership re-
gions. Importantly, the reviewedneuroimagingdata show that ac-
tivations in these regions depend on the four constraints of BSC.
Next to the degree of separation between hand, face, and
body ownership regions, there remain fascinating open ques-
tions for BSC, especially in relation to the brain mechanisms
related to the global components of BSC; future research should
aim at identifying the differences between the neural bases of
self-identification, self-location, and first-person perspective.
For instance, different brain activations have been reported
during prolonged visuo-tactile stimulation when the virtual trunk
is seen from an embodied viewpoint (looking down your own
body; viewing a virtual body as employed in the Body-swap illu-
sion) as compared to when the trunk (back) of a virtual body is
seen from a more distant viewpoint (as in the full-body illusion),
suggesting different neural and functional mechanisms for self-
identification and self-location (e.g., Ionta et al., 2011; Pfeiffer
et al., 2013). We argue that the key regions for self-identification
are within the PMC-IPS network, whereas key areas for self-
location are located in more lateral temporo-parietal regions,
encompassing parietal operculum, supramarginal gyrus, poste-
rior superior temporal gyrus, and posterior insula, (Ionta et al.,
2011, 2014), as well as posterior cingulate cortex (Guterstam
et al., 2015). Systematic human studies are needed to differen-
tiate the self-identification PMC/IPS system from the self-loca-
tion TPC/PCC system, ideally using automatized and roboti-
cally-controlled experimental approaches.
Models of Multisensory Integration and BSC
Computational models have focused on how inputs from two
or more senses are combined to improve perception based on
the principles of optimal integration and Bayesian computations.
These models have been applied to visuo-tactile integration
(Ernst and Banks, 2002; Ernst and Bu¨lthoff, 2004) to explain
object perception during haptic manipulation and to audio-
visual integration to explain phenomena such as the ventrilo-
quism effect or sound-induced visual illusions (Alais and Burr,
2004; Magnotti et al., 2013; Wozny et al., 2010; Wozny and
Shams, 2011). The integration of visuo-vestibular stimuli for
translational and rotational self-motion perception has also
been studied by several investigators (Fetsch et al., 2012,158 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.2013; Prsa et al., 2012, 2015). In all these cases, it has been
shown that inputs from different modalities are combined
accordingly to maximum-likelihood estimation models: multi-
sensory estimate is the weighted sum of unisensory signals,
where signals from the less noisy modality (i.e., with lower vari-
ance and higher reliability) are weighted more strongly during
the integration process. This integration rule minimizes error
so that the perceptual precision of the multisensory estimate is
always higher than the individual estimates.
Other models focused on neural mechanisms of multisensory
integration, and some were developed to explain the non-linear
properties of audio-visual integration by implementing the tem-
poral, spatial, and inverse effectiveness laws in neural structures
like the superior colliculus (Cuppini et al., 2010, 2011; Stein et al.,
2014; Xu et al., 2015). Other research investigated how signals
from different sensory modalities are aligned into common
reference frames for integration. Early studies focused on vi-
suo-motor transformations, necessary to re-map visual inputs,
originally coded in eye-centered reference frames, into body-
part centered reference frames, such as an arm-centered refer-
ence frame for reaching movements toward a seen object
(Andersen et al., 1985; Cohen and Andersen, 2002; Colby and
Goldberg, 1999; Salinas and Thier, 2000). These reference frame
transformations have been proposed to be implemented at the
level of individual neurons, so that a single cell’s response to a vi-
sual stimulus occurring within their receptive field is rescaled as a
function of eye, head, or arm posture (a mechanism known as
gain fields). Neurons with gain field properties have been exten-
sively described in parietal cortex and fronto-parietal networks
supporting body-object interactions (for reviews, see Colby,
1998; Grefkes and Fink, 2005). Others extended these reference
frame transformation models to the population level and impli-
cated not only visuo-motor neurons, but also auditory, somato-
sensory, as well as vestibular and proprioceptive neurons in
multisensory integration processes. In particular, Pouget and
colleagues (Deneve and Pouget, 2004; Ma et al., 2006; Pouget
et al., 2002) proposed an influential computational framework
based on neural network dynamics, consisting of multiple layers
ranging from layers coding unisensory inputs to multisensory
layers. Following this approach, unisensory layers are intercon-
nected with different multisensory layers, containing so-called
basis function units, which, due to attractor dynamics, code
multisensory stimuli in mixed reference frames, consistent with
partially shifting receptive fields. Such models are supported
by neurophysiological data showing that multimodal neurons
have not only eye-centered or head-centered receptive fields
but also mixed or combined receptive fields (e.g., combining
eye-centered and head-centered reference frames), especially
in regions of the posterior parietal cortex (i.e., area LIP, VIP and
MIP), which are known to integratemultisensory inputs (Duhamel
et al., 1998; Avillac et al., 2005, 2007) and enable sensorimotor
transformations (Andersen and Buneo, 2002).
Sabes and colleagues tested the dynamics of neural network
models for reference frame transformations and multisensory
integration based on multiple neuronal layers, proposing that
the computations implemented to combine inputs from unisen-
sory layers into multisensory layers are learned and depend on
sensory experience. Using machine learning, they proposed to
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integration in terms of a density estimation model, whereby the
distribution of observed data (the activity of unisensory neurons)
is encoded by a set of latent variables (the activity of neurons in
multisensory layers) and a set of parameters (the synaptic con-
nections between unisensory and multisensory layers) (Dadarlat
et al., 2015; Makin et al., 2013). The network is trained (by chang-
ing the synaptic weights) so to generate the same distribution of
unisensory activities when they are driven by the multisensory
neurons as when they are driven by their true ‘‘hidden’’ causes
in the world. This requires that the latent variables encode the
‘‘hidden causes’’ of the data and their relationships, learning a
range of neural computations, such as optimal integration of
signals with a common cause, separation of signals with different
causes, and coordinate transformations.
Magosso and Serino also used a multilayer architecture to
design a neural network of the arm PPS representation (Ma-
gosso et al., 2010a, 2010b; Serino et al., 2015). The model
includes a series of unisensory layers (representing tactile, audi-
tory, and visual areas) connected to a multisensory layer. In this
model, the strength of the synapses from unisensory tomultisen-
sory neurons is set to reproduce the response tuning that has
been observed for near-body stimuli of the PPS system. Thus,
the weight of the synapses from unisensory neurons with tactile,
visual, or auditory receptive fields on the body or at short dis-
tances from the body is strong, whereas the synaptic weight
from unisensory neurons with receptive fields covering far
space is weak. The model reproduced behavioral data showing
enhanced tactile processing when dynamic visual and auditory
stimuli enter the boundaries of the PPS (Serino et al., 2015; Can-
zoneri et al., 2012). By implementing feedback projections from
multisensory to unisensory neurons and inhibitory interhemi-
spheric projections, the model also explained behavioral data
from brain-damaged patients suffering from crossmodal extinc-
tion (Magosso et al., 2010b). In addition, the model proposes a
mechanism to account for PPS-related plasticity. The weights
of the model connections, indeed, are continuously defined
through experience due to Hebbian learning aimed at simulating
everyday life hand-objects integration. Hand stimulation acti-
vates the tactile unisensory layers, which in turn activates the
multisensory layer. Usually, tactile stimulation is coupled with
visual or auditory stimulation occurring within the PPS, thus
activating visual or auditory unisensory neurons with receptive
fields close to the body. Instead, neurons with receptive fields
covering far space are not, or much less frequently, activated.
In this way, the synaptic weights from unimodal visual or auditory
neurons with receptive fields close to the body continuously
strengthen due to the concurrent firing of the post-synaptic
multisensory neurons (activated by tactile stimulation), while
the synaptic weights from unimodal visual or auditory neurons
with far receptive fields decay. However, such stimulation
patterns may vary, for instance, if people use tools to reach far
objects, as many studies in multisensory integration have shown
(see Maravita and Iriki, 2002, for a well-known review). During
tool use, people receive a tactile stimulation on their hand from
the tool-extended body, synchronously coupled with visual
and/or auditory stimulation from far space, where the tool exerts
its function. Thus, tool-use, inducing a synchronous near-farstimulation, might result in a strengthening of the synapses
between unisensory neurons with far receptive fields and
multisensory neurons. Serino et al. (2015) recently provided
the computational demonstration of this prediction and also
showed, in a behavioral experiment, that administering synchro-
nous tactile stimulation on the participants’ hand and auditory
stimulation at a far location, even without any tool use, resulted
in an extension of PPS boundaries, which reproduced the effect
obtained after actual tool use (Canzoneri et al., 2013b).
We note that the patterns of stimulation used to investigate
model performance in the case of extending the PPS via tool
use (Serino et al., 2015) resembles that used to induce the rubber
hand illusion. In the latter illusion, participants receive tactile stim-
ulationon their hand that is coupledwith synchronous visual stim-
ulation of the rubber hand, placed at a distance, whereas in the
former case auditory stimulation at the tip of the tool is coupled
with tactile stimulation of the hand. We speculate that a similar
model can account for the changes in multisensory bodily
perception and the shift of the arm-related PPS boundary toward
an artificial replacement of the body during the rubber hand illu-
sion (see Brozzoli et al., 2012a; Graziano et al., 2000) and tool
use (Serino et al., 2015). In case this hypothesis is confirmed by
computational and experimental work, it would be possible to
linkmechanisms of plasticity in PPS representationwith changes
in BSC induced by multisensory bodily stimulations.
Closely related to this point, Samad et al. (2015) recently
modeled proprioceptive drifts during the rubber hand illusion as
the result of amultisensory integration based on Bayesian causal
inferences. Based on tactile and proprioceptive cues from the
real handandvisual cues from the rubber hand,Bayesiancompu-
tation was used to determine whether these multiple sensory in-
puts relate to thesameobject (illusoryownershipandpropriocep-
tive drift) or to two different objects, depending on the temporal
and the spatial coherence between the multiple bodily signals.
Themodel also predicts that nomultisensory integration nor pro-
prioceptive drift occur if the rubber hand is placed at distance of
more than 30 cm from the real hand; this is compatible with
behavioral data (Lloyd, 2007), the size of the arm-centered PPS
in humans (Canzoneri et al., 2012), the size of visuo-tactile recep-
tive fields of arm-centered PPS neurons in monkeys (Graziano
and Cooke, 2006), and the distance-dependent activation pat-
ternsobserved in humanPMCand IPS (Makin et al., 2007;Gentile
et al., 2011; Brozzoli et al., 2011). These data confirm that multi-
sensory integration of bodily signals is constrained by the dimen-
sions of PPS and that such constraints likely impact BSC.
We note, however, that a Bayesian model based only on bot-
tom-up inputs cannot explain why hand ownership is absent or
weakerwhen the stroking is applied over a non-bodily visual stim-
ulus (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris, 2010) or on a rubber hand
placed in an incompatible body posture (Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005). Bottom-up integration ofmultisensory inputs is necessary,
but not sufficient, for these effects. Additional signals about the
body from visual and proprioceptive inputs regulate the degree
of multisensory integration and determine illusory hand owner-
ship. The interaction between bottom-up inputs and top-down
modulation in generating the rubber hand illusion has been
recently formalized intoBayesianmodels incorporatingpredictive
coding (Clark, 2013) and the free energy principle (Friston, 2010).Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 159
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action between bottom-up neural processes, coding sensory in-
formation, and top-down processes, generating predictions
about the incoming sensory inputs. Information travels continu-
ously in feedforward and feedback directions between bottom-
up and top-down levels,with themain regulating principle ofmini-
mizing thedifferencesbetween thegeneratedpredictions and the
incoming sensory inputs. This architecture is repeated hierar-
chically at successively more complex stages of neural informa-
tion processing. These models have been recently applied to
describe bodily illusions such as the rubber hand illusion as the
result of different unisensory inputs (touch and proprioception
from the real hand and vision of the rubber hand), initially pro-
cessed in unisensory areas, and then integrated in multisensory
areas, depending on a series of predictions based on prior expe-
rience (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Hohwy and Paton, 2010; Lima-
nowski and Blankenburg, 2013). If a mismatch arises from
incoming sensory inputs and predictions, the prior is updated to
minimize error predictions. In everyday life, tactile stimulation on
thehandandvisual informationwithin thePPSabout ahandbeing
synchronously touched are integrated because the standard pre-
diction is that those inputs derive from thesameobject (one’s own
hand).During the rubberhand illusion, however, the incongruence
between tactile and visual inputs (due to the proprioceptive
mismatch between the position of the real and the rubber hand,
or by the appearance of the rubber hand) generates a strong
prediction error, which needs to be minimized. This is done by
changing predictions and modulating sensory inputs so that the
proprioceptivemismatch (proprioceptivedrift) and theperceptual
difference between the real and the rubber hand is reduced, re-
sulting in the new prediction that ‘‘the rubber hand is my hand,’’
thus supporting embodiment (see Limanowski and Blankenburg,
2015 for recent neuroimaging data supporting this model).
It has also been argued that similar models based on Bayesian
computation, predictive coding, and free energy principle may
also account for changes in face ownership during the enface-
ment illusion and face perception (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013,
2014) and to BSC and the different kinds of bodily illusions,
including the full-body and the body-swap illusion (Limanowski
and Blankenburg, 2013; Hohwy and Paton, 2010; Apps and Tsa-
kiris, 2014). These models may also explain why bodily illusions
can be easily obtained in virtual reality contexts. Thus, whenever
individuals throughout their entire life look toward their body they
of course see their own body. Hence when in immersive virtual
reality contexts they control a virtual body while receiving sen-
sory stimulation and carrying out movements, the simplest hy-
pothesis for the brain to adopt is that what they are seeing is their
own body. Thus, in order to minimize prediction errors, sensory
information signaling that the seen body does not look like the
real body and that ‘‘virtual reality isn’t real’’ is discounted at the
perceptual and subjective level. This is emphasized by another
manipulation that many bodily illusions based on immersive vir-
tual reality carried out by Slater and colleagues included: the
participant sees a reflection in a virtual mirror of a virtual body.
The reflection they see is a virtual body rather than their real
one, while in their entire life individuals have seen their own
body reflected back when looking in amirror. Nevertheless, peo-
ple self-identify with the virtual body, suggesting that the ‘‘prior160 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.probability’’ that what they see in a mirror is their body is over-
whelming (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005; Slater, 2009).
Although there is awealth of computationalmodelsonmultisen-
sory integration,multisensory illusions, and reference frame trans-
formations, we currently lack models on the integration of multi-
sensory bodily stimuli within PPS underlying BSC. We argue that
models related to arm-centered multisensory PPS and hand
ownership, if adapted to the reviewed trunk-related processing
principles, are likely to also account for self-identification and
self-location during the full-body and body-swap illusions. Thus,
more computational work is needed to compute the mechanisms
of the integrationofmultisensorybodily inputs thatareof relevance
for trunk-centered aspects of BSC, accounting for the constraints
of vestibular and proprioceptive signals, body-related visual sig-
nals, and PPS. In addition, none of the available models, at the
moment, seems able to convincingly account for the subjective
BSC components induced by the body-swap and full-body illu-
sions, including self-location and first-person perspective.
Conclusion and Outlook
We reviewed the brain mechanisms of multisensory integration of
bodily stimuli underlying BSC. We highlighted four different con-
straints for designing neurocomputational models of BSC and
showed how the integration of multisensory bodily stimuli for
BSC depends on (1) proprioception, (2) body-related visual infor-
mation, (3) PPS, and (4) embodiment (see Box 1). These con-
straints were highlighted in the reviewed data from human
behavior, animal neurophysiology, human neuroimaging, and
computationalmodels, suggesting thepresenceof twodistributed
and partially overlapping cortical networks of BSC: one in fronto-
parietal cortex (IPS and PMC) processing signals for hand and
face ownership (i.e., ownership for circumscribed body parts)
and a second in more posterior temporo-parietal cortex (supra-
marginal gyrus, insula, superior temporal gyrus) processing sig-
nals for such global aspects of BSC, such as self-identification
and self-location. Both networks are densely interconnected and
partially overlapping, forming theneural substrate for themultisen-
sory integration of bodily stimuli underlying BSC.
Such knowledge is starting to impact engineering and in
particular virtual reality technology. Over the last 30 years, tech-
nological developments in virtual reality have struggled to
modulate and control, substitute, and enhance human experi-
ence. Recent advances in digital technologies, such as commu-
nication, personal computing, and wearable technologies, now
offer powerful tools to manipulate bodily and environmental
information to study first-person perspective (Petkova and
Ehrsson, 2008; Ionta et al., 2011; Slater et al., 2010; Maselli
and Slater, 2013). Detailed descriptions of the brain mechanisms
of BSC might inform the exploitation of such technologies to
produce or enhance the experience of being in other places
and to control and perceive multiple artificial bodies, or body
parts, and robots (see Blanke, 2012; Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005) for more extensive discussion). Moreover, these methods
are currently applied in the field of social psychology to study
and potentially reduce implicit racial and other social biases,
by inducing implicit self-identification for out-group members
(in terms of race, age, or gender; Banakou et al., 2013; Peck
et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2014, 2015).
Box 2. Future Directions
Most of the data about integration of multisensory bodily signals for BSC focus on single body-part representations. Thus, we lack
information about global aspect of BSC. In particular:
d More single unit data, imaging data, and computational models are needed about trunk-centered mechanisms of multisensory
integration within PPS, critical for global aspects of BSC.
d We do not know which computational mechanisms distinguish body-parts versus trunk-centered, global coding of BSC.
d While mechanisms of body ownership and self-identification have been explored, more work is needed on self-location and,
even more, on 1PP.
d More animal research inmodel simpler than primates (e.g., rodents especially, but also insects) might contribute to unreveal the
biological and genetic basis of BSC.
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PerspectiveThere are several outstanding issues that need to be solved in
order to design neurocomputational models of BSC, which are
summarized in Box 2. First, while some of the necessary condi-
tions of multisensory stimulation inducing specific changes in
BSC are known (based on four constraints reviewed in this pa-
per), many of the parameters for manipulating BSC are currently
less well specified (e.g., the minimal duration of multisensory
stimulation affecting BSC, the precise features of stimulation
inducing stronger effects). The integration of psychophysical
studies,with computationalmodels andanimal neurophysiology,
might contribute to provide such information. Second, most
currently available data describe themechanisms of visuo-tactile
integration for hand-related inputs, hand-centered spatial repre-
sentations, andhandownership. For themore relevant aspects of
BSC, such as self-identification and self-location (and first-per-
sonperspective; not reviewedhere), behavioral, animal, and neu-
roimaging data, as well as computational descriptions, are
currently missing. As a simple thought experiment shows, finger
or limb amputation would likely induce some alterations of limb
ownership andphantom limbexperiences inmost patients (Ram-
achandran andHirstein, 1998), but it does not radically alter BSC,
as amputees maintain normal self-identification with the body,
normal self-location, and normal first-person perspective.
Conversely, consider the case of neurological patients suffering
from out-of-body experiences due to damage to temporo-parie-
tal cortex. These patients suffer strong BSC alterations with
altered self-identification, self-location, and first-person
perspective, as they report to feel abnormally elevated self-loca-
tion, self-identify with this elevated position, and experience to
perceive the world from a disembodied perspective (Blanke
et al., 2002; Ionta et al., 2011;Blanke, 2012;Heydrich andBlanke,
2013). None of the reviewed models can currently account for
these clinical alterations of BSC that could be described not as
phantom limb but as phantom body experiences. However, the
existing trunk-related behavioral and neuroscientific data sug-
gest that neurocomputational accounts of BSC are possible
and should extend models proposed for hand-centered BSC
(e.g., Makin et al., 2008; Samad et al., 2015) and other multisen-
soryeffects to the studyof global components of self-experience.
More animal, neuroimaging, and modeling work on trunk-
centeredmultisensorybodily processing is needed to understand
and describe how global components of BSC underlying subjec-
tive experience are implemented in the mammalian brain. A clear
definition of BSC, as in the present study, that is based on neural
mechanisms of integration of multisensory bodily signals mayallow to build powerful bridges with biology. Highly independent
from human language, memory, and other cognitive functions,
the mechanisms of BSC have already been studied in monkey;
we argue that they can also be studied in rodents andDrosophila,
targeting the neural, genetic, and molecular origins of BSC. In
mice, for example, we argue that the trunk-centeredmultisensory
BSC system likely relates to other neural systems involved in
generating spatial maps of the environment such as place and
grid cells (Moser et al., 2008), calibrating the coordinates of the
subject of conscious experience not only with respect to the sub-
ject’s body but also to egocentric and allocentric maps of the
external world. This work needs to investigate multisensory inte-
gration of bodily stimuli relying on the processing of axial cues in
trunk- and head-centered coordinates instead of the visuo-tactile
hand-related cues that have been studied in innumerous investi-
gations. We note that the morphology of the trunk is particularly
well preserved across animal species. We also suggest that in-
puts from the vestibular system to this trunk-centered BSC sys-
tem are not only fundamental to determine the orientation and
motion of the body in space, but also for BSC, especially self-
location, self-motion, and the first-person perspective.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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